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ABSTRACT 
 
The Evaluation of Local Municipalities’ Performance  
Through Analysis on Mayor’s Personal Background 
By 
Yujong Lee 
 
 
 
This paper searched the relation between leader’s characters and his or her performance. In 
this paper target leaders were mayors in local governments in Korea. There are 230 mayors in 
local municipalities in Korea. This study uses the data from biographic intelligence and 
classifies into small groups, such as profession, political party, age, educational background, 
elected times, ex-assemblyman and change of mayor. And the evaluation indexes were 
mainly financial performances in local government. For examples, they were the effort index 
of fiscal self-reliance, the local government’s financial independence, increasing rate of 
internal financing, educational and training expenditures and so on. However, a large 
proportion of the result was statically non-significant. Some results showed that there were no 
differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, I conclude that mayor’s experiences 
did not influence on their performances and their abilities did not reflect local governments’ 
performances. Moreover, lots of results were statistically non-significant. 19 of total 84 
results were just statistically significant. It was 22.6% of all result. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Objective of the study 
 
Who will you vote in the next local election? It is difficult to select the right mayor among 
candidates for city management. There is no rule and no education about your selection. You 
just assume who the best politician is by your feelings. Usually, even you do not know the 
name of the mayor nor that of the governor. But we spend lots of money from our salary. 
They manage lots of budget. But we don’t know lists of their expenditure. So in this paper I 
examine and evaluate their performance by document on their fiscal accountability, anti-
corruption, budget of human resource education and so on. We need measure. Mayor’s career 
experiences are important. Their personal history affects their performance and public budget. 
 
Ministry of public administration and security evaluates local government every year by 
several indexes. Evaluation indexes were composed of public administration, social welfare, 
health policy, local economy, local development, cultural policy and so on. However, its 
evaluation focused on metropolitan city and province. There were few evaluating results on 
mayors in the small local governments like Si, Gun and Gu. Despite lots of discussion about 
leadership in local governments, there has been relatively little broad-scale empirical analysis. 
 
Moreover, there was a lack of research on the evaluation of mayor’s performance in local 
government through analysis on his or her personal background. This study focuses on 
mayors elected in the municipal level of the last local elections in terms of their leadership 
styles and characteristics, career and experiences. 
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In this paper I divide their characters into their profession, party, age, educational background, 
elected times, experience as a lawmaker and the change of mayor. They contain lots of 
meanings. Their experiences have influence on their performances and mayors’ abilities will 
reflect local governments’ performance. Local municipalities’ performance through analysis 
on mayor’s personal background will be an index for evaluating mayors’ abilities. The 
method of measurement is to assess the fiscal accountability, anti-corruption, budget of 
human resource education and so on.  
 
1.2 Development of Research Questions 
 
Research Questions 
 
RQ 1: Do mayor’s characteristics affect on the financial performance in local government? 
RQ 2: Do mayor’s experiences affect on the financial performance in local government? 
RQ 3: Do mayor’s characteristics affect on the ethical management in local government? 
RQ 4: Is it possible that mayor’s performance could be evaluated by broad-scale empirical 
analysis? 
RQ 5: Are the results of evaluation statistically significant? 
RQ 6: Does the change of leadership affect on the financial performance in local government? 
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II. BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
The studies on the mayoral leadership in Korea were few in 1990s. At the time, local 
municipalities were governed by mayors or governors appointed by central government and 
all local councils were still dissolved by the provisional measures law for local autonomy 
since 1961. The political and managerial powers of local governments belonged to the central 
government. Moreover, appointed mayor’s rank in official society was relatively low and the 
mayoral leadership didn’t exist. 
However, local administrative hierarchy in Korea was changed by the new local autonomy 
act in 1988. The election of the mayors and local councilors was held in 1995 several years 
after the revision of the local autonomy act and democratic local autonomy system was 
launched. It also tried to establish a clear-cut line between central and local government 
affairs and adjust the power of the local council. Mayors in local governments can manage a 
portion of provincial affairs such as local development projects, health care, local public 
enterprise, housing and encouragement of local economy. They can use or manage the local 
budget for their local development projects at their discretion. The budget reaches to the 20 
percent of annual budget at the maximum.  
Mayor’s role is very important for a city and citizens. The financial conditions in local 
government hang to mayors’ decisions. Some scholar majoring in public administration tried 
to write about the mayoral leadership in 2000s. Lee, Kim, Park and Adler (2003) discussed 
the effectiveness of different leadership styles in different national settings. They analyzed 
data on the leadership styles of 75 Korean and 78 New Zealand local government leaders and 
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concluded employees in Korea and in New Zealand were satisfied by and committed to their 
organizations in different leadership styles.  
Choi (2006) concluded that desirable role of executives of metropolitan government are 
active driving forces by executing visions and ability to renovate organizations to adjust 
changing environments and to improve policy to ensure professionalism in human resource 
management. In addition, a positive effort to cut down expenses and to procure financial 
resources in internal management category also was regarded as an important role.  
Park and Joo (2008) touched on the leadership of the mayors elected in local elections. They 
argued personal characteristics of the mayors on their leadership characteristics, policy 
preferences and the factors affecting their reelection. Policy preferences and the factors 
affecting mayor’s reelection through personal characteristics were investigated by the 
empirical analysis. 
Sung, Choi, and Im (2008) reached the conclusion that transformational leadership has much 
more of an effect on constitutional devotion than transactional leadership. The level of 
constitutional devotion is a key factor in organizational outcome and effectiveness increases. 
Koh (2009) analyzed the patterns of mayor’s leadership and showed the desirable type of 
leadership to increase organizational effectiveness. His result verifies that innovative type of 
leadership and entrepreneur type of leadership are preferred to increase organizational 
effectiveness and that administrative development reinforces the relations between leadership 
and organizational effectiveness. 
Roh and Kim (2009) argued that the local government leadership influenced the job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment. They concluded that transformational leadership 
has more powerful influence on job satisfaction and organizational commitment than 
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transactional leadership. The charisma factor of transformational leadership and rewards 
factor are significant to organizational effectiveness. 
Kim (2010) mentioned that different leadership of a local self-governing body demanded for 
the upcoming different period of the 21st century. Specially, a model of residents-centered 
governance is aptly to explain realities of the 21st century on the basis of a wide variety of 
values and cultures. Under this model, a creative leadership of values is going to be essential 
to cope with differences among residents. 
Western scholars in public administration have argued the leadership of local government 
long ago. Western countries have a long history in the local autonomy. Ferman (1983) 
showed the case of Boston mayor White who developed a significant amount of power. He 
argued that White’s role as a power accumulator, his ability to combine leadership strategies, 
his use of federal money and his shift from audience to constituency. The case of White’s 
ability to acquire power pointed to the importance and necessity of political skills. The case 
demonstrated that leadership success is closely tied to the development of political 
organizations.  
Wolman, Strate and Melchior (1996) have examined the impact of leadership change at the 
urban level on two important aspect of public policy –change in public spending per capita 
and change in priorities as measured by expenditure shares. The change was greater in these 
mayor-council cities when the newly elected mayor had defeated an incumbent than when he 
or she had won election following the retirement of the previous mayor.  
 
Wheeland (2002) concluded the mayors in the forty largest cities in the United States 
increased their chances to be successful if they acted in ways that were compatible with the 
formal institutional features defining their jobs, because doing so followed the logic of 
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appropriateness and therefore preserved trust among officials and citizens; if they have the 
strongest version of either type of mayoral leadership; and if they are supported by other 
formal institutional features, such as a full-time salary.  
 
Weikart (2003) alluded to the subject that the new public management (NPM) mayors of the 
1990s sought to increase citizens’ satisfaction with government and to reduce the costs of 
government. The major intended strategies to achieve those goals were managed competition 
between the public and private sectors, increased efficiency with an emphasis on 
measurement, privatization, and decentralization while empowering government employees. 
 
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) reached the conclusion that mayors who spend more 
during their terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or of a successor 
of the same political party. They used a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian 
municipalities from 1988 to 2000. However, there is a lack of research on the evaluation of 
mayor’s performance in local government through analysis on his or her personal background. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Foundations 
 
The leader was defined as a Great Man who had some exceptional features of behavior and 
seen to have some identifiable traits of character which made him a great leader (Banner and 
Blasingame, 1988). To evaluate mayor’s performance in local government through analysis 
on his or her personal background, the discussion about the leadership should be preceded. 
Mayor’ performance comes true through his or her leadership because the leadership of 
mayor makes his or her outcomes in local government.  
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What is leadership? Stodgill states (1974) in his comprehensive review of leadership studies 
that “there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have 
attempted to define the concept.” The leadership means like that in the dictionary.  
“The position of being the leader of a team, organization, etc. or the quality of being good 
at leading a team, organization, country, etc. or all the people who lead a group, organization, 
etc. or the position of being in front of others in a competition.” (Longman Dictionary of 
Contemporary English , 1995) 
Leadership is the investigation of how one individual, labeled as a leader, influences a second 
individual, or group of individuals, labeled followers (Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992 ; Douglas J. 
Brown, Kristyn A. Scott, Hayden Lewis , 2004).  
 
Antonakis, Cianciolo and Sternberg (2004) defines leadership as the nature of the influencing 
process. They viewed its resultant outcomes that occurred between a leader and followers and 
the influencing process is explained by the leader’s dispositional characteristics and 
behaviors, follower perceptions and attributions of the leader. 
 
At first, the leadership theory will be touched in this paper, because the evaluation of mayor’s 
performance stands on the basis of theory of leadership. The theory of leadership can be 
dated back to Plato, Sun Tzu and Machiavelli. Plato wants to emphasize the Ruler’s personal 
abilities to take good care of the State (Takala, 1998). Ruler can have an inherent talent for 
leadership, but he can also learn the skill to rule by his own personal vision, in spite of the 
rules and laws binding the common citizens. He thought that a true leader must have this 
charismatic trait, and also be able to apply it in practice on his own agenda.  
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Sun Tzu said that the general is the pillar of the State (Cantrell, 2003). If the pillar has 
mastered all points of war, the State will be strong and if the pillar is defective, the State will 
be weak. The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead and the good general cultivates his 
resources. Machiavelli would both see as critical the importance of supplying quality 
information to boards of directors, management or government at all levels to maintain one’s 
environmental advantage through being able to advise decision makers on future options and 
priorities, and he would advocate an awareness of the strategic importance of access to 
decision makers and being able to influence management and government to gain such 
competitive advantage (Phil Harris, 2010).  
 
Plato, Machiavelli and Sun Tzu touched on the leadership in the abstract. Leadership scholars 
researched the styles of leaders and divided theirs leadership styles. Antonakis, Cianciolo and 
Sternberg (2004) have divided leadership research into eight major schools: Trait, behavioral, 
contingency, contextual, skeptics, relational, new leadership and information processing 
School. Their distribution is a general method in academic society. They defined leader trait 
as relatively stable and coherent integrations of personal characteristics that foster a 
consistent pattern of leadership performance across a variety of group and organizational 
situations. These characteristics reflect a range of stable individual differences, including 
personality, temperament, motives, cognitive abilities, skills and expertise.  
 
Specially, the leadership in public organization is important. The leadership in private 
organization is watched less than the leadership in public organization, seeing that the latter 
has more stakeholders. The public shows less tolerance for leaders’ mistakes, foibles, and 
structural challenges as its skepticism has grown (Yankelovich, 1991). Moreover, comparing 
managers in cities of different size, Morgan and Watson find those working in larger 
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municipalities typically had less power than their smaller city peers (David R, Morgan, 
Sheilah S. Watson, 1992). 
 
However, some theorists insisted that there is nothing to do with the leader and the 
organizational outcomes. Over the last few decades, strategy researchers have paid 
considerable attention to the question of how CEO origin (outsider versus insider) affects 
organizational outcomes. Without choice, CEOs can do little to influence firm outcomes 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987).  
 
On the other hand, some theorists (Barnard, 1938) and many practitioners (Drucker 1954; 
Collins, 2001) have argued that leadership—especially in a firm’s senior positions— has an 
important impact on firm performance and survival at all levels. Organizations are often seen 
as a direct reflection of their CEO and top managers (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 
2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Certain CEO characteristics, such as demographic 
background and career experiences, appear to be especially desirable for successfully 
managing the constantly evolving business environment (Beal & Yasai-Ardekani, 2000; 
Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001). 
 
Alison Mackey (2008) argued that in certain settings the CEO effect on corporate-parent 
performance is substantially more important than that of industry and firm effects, but only 
moderately more important than industry and firm effects on business-segment performance. 
Takala (1998) discusses that management is seen as an activity which is especially typical of 
large corporations, but it is said that there is leadership in every organization, not only in 
business organizations. Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010) expected that the origin of the CEO 
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represents one important organizational condition that is likely to affect the relationship 
between the level of strategic change and firm performance.  
Greater convergence with and usage of private sector business norms and practices raise 
questions on whether major private sector issues and concerns also translate to the public 
sector. One of the most probable explanations of why the financial measures were used 
mostly to explain the successor impact on organizational performance is that financial 
measures provide a common language for analysis and comparing companies (Verweire and 
van den Berghe, 2004). 
Externally reported financial information is increasingly a barometer of performance and 
accountability with growing links to public sector managers’ self-interests such as 
compensation and career development (Pilcher and Van der Zahn, 2010). Public sector 
management, therefore, have greater incentive to manipulate externally reported financial 
performance. Costs result from any instrument used to manipulate financial performance.  
Prior private sector based empirical research identifies various motivations and desired 
outcomes from discretionary accrual management. For example, like private sector 
counterparts, public sector management may manage and manipulate discretionary accruals 
to achieve a pre-determined target. 
As an increasing number of countries attempt to use the same accounting model in the public 
and private sectors, it is argued the continuing importance of the traditional public sector 
accounting approach is increasingly overlooked. 
Management and manipulation of financial accounting information can no longer be seen as 
an issue specific to the private sector. Use of and reliance on accrual-based financial 
accounting information is increasing in the public sector. Furthermore, stakeholders 
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(particularly in countries like Australia and New Zealand) are increasingly utilizing accrual-
based financial accounting information in the decision-making process on key issues related 
to the public sector.  
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III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
In this paper, it will be tested whether the characteristics of mayors affect on the performance 
of local government. Theoretically, their relationship between mayor and their characteristics 
is close.  
 
In the enterprises, the individual managerial factors emphasize the difference among CEOs 
and their ability to identify and take advantage of the leeway that environmental and 
organizational factors provide (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Leadership is an extremely 
important component of human performance and that research on the determinants of 
leadership performance is critical for understanding and improving organizational 
effectiveness. One important domain of the determinants of leadership performance is 
individual personality (Benson and Campbell, 2007). 
 
3.1 Mayor’s Career Experience 
 
Mayor’s previous experiences give him or her with cognitive biases and distinct knowledge 
which affect his or her strategic decisions. Mayor unconsciously learned the political and 
managerial judgment from his or her previous experiences. 
 
Many of these researches started with a study by Dearborn and Simon (1958). They discussed 
that experience with the rewards, goals and methods of a particular functional area causes 
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managers to perceive and interpret information in ways that suit and reinforce their functional 
training. Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that prior experience also influenced one’s 
orientation to the external environment that affected CEO’s strategy. Fischer and Pollock 
(2004) discussed that the experience of a CEO can have an effect on an organization’s 
efficiency and its ability to attract customers and new investor capital. Koyuncu, Firfiray, 
Claes, and Hamori (2010) concluded that CEOs with a functional background in operations 
attain higher post-succession performance than CEOs with other functional backgrounds. 
They derived the result from analysis on a sample of 437 CEOs who lead large-sized U.S. 
firms in eight industries.  
Therefore, it can be theoretically possible that mayor’s professional career will affect the 
financial performance in local government.  
H 1: Mayor’s professional career will affect the financial performance in local government.  
3.2 Mayor’s Political spectrum  
 
Political parties are regarded as ‘beasts in the forest’ in England and Germany seeing that 
they make binding decisions in camera (Copus, 2004). Central parties intervene in mayor’s 
judgments and the local government affairs. Generally speaking, mayor complies with the 
central party’s policy for his or her next election. In Germany, local councils were sometimes 
against parliamentarization and the replacement of local notables by party politicians but it 
was largely not successful (Gunlicks, 1986). On the other hand, in New York State partisan 
disputes are common and intense, even if mayoral and other candidates do not openly declare 
their partisanship at election time (Elcock, 2008). 
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Fenwick and Elcock (2005) examined the new leadership role in the English mayoral 
authorities. Even though the mayor is a party member, there is an independent approach to 
the exercise of power. The mayor who plays the role of manager also provides political roles. 
Whatever the mayor’s relationship to local parties it is, the mayoral role is one of strong 
political management, too.  
In this paper, the relationship between mayor’s political spectrum and financial performance 
in local government will be argued.  
H 2: Mayor’s political spectrum will affect the financial performance in local government.  
3.3 Mayor’s Age Group 
 
Age is a positive factor in terms of firm performance (Gottesman and Morey, 2010). Age 
changes an individual’s belief systems, perspective and human networks. Older mayors tend 
to be less risk, whereas young mayors are more willing to chase innovative growth strategies 
and to handle creative ideas. These trends were theoretically proved by the several scholars. 
Firms with older CEOs tend to cut capital expenditure (Conyon and Florou, 2003). Older 
CEOs are more likely to engage in earnings management (Davidson, Xie, Xu, and Ning, 
2007). Younger CEOs are physically and psychologically more energetic, less risk-averse, 
and faster to learn and make decisions (Wang and Davidson III, 2009). 
H 3: Mayor’s age will affect the financial performance in local government.  
3.4 Mayor’s Educational Background 
 
Many scholars insist that the educational background of the CEO is not related to financial 
performance. Gottesman and Morey (2010) indicate that the educational background of the 
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CEO is not related to financial performance. They find that firms managed by CEOs with 
MBAs don’t perform differently than firms with CEOs who hold non-liberal arts 
undergraduate degrees, law degrees, or liberal arts undergraduate degrees. They also find that 
firms run by CEOs from more selective schools perform no better than firms run by CEOs 
from less selective schools. 
On the other hand, Norburn and Birley (1988) have examined the effect of the CEO’s 
educational background on firm performance. Top management teams which demonstrate a 
preponderance of wider educational training will outperform those which do not. 
H 4: Mayor’s educational background will affect the financial performance in local 
government.  
3.5 Mayor’s Elected Times  
 
Mayor’s elected times is an important factor to measure the performance in local government. 
Mayor, who is elected twice or three times, is accustomed to his or her role and position 
seeing that he or she underwent trial and error in first tenure. On the other hand, newly-
appointed mayor has no time to play a role as a mayor. Simsek (2007) argued that CEO 
tenure influenced performance through its influences on Top Management Team (TMT) risk 
taking and the firm’s pursuit of entrepreneurial initiatives. CEO tenure had a positive net 
effect on TMT risk taking, rather than the inertial and complacent effects suggested by upper 
echelons and prospect theorists. Allgood and Farrell (2003) find that the hazard initially 
increases until the fifth year of CEO tenure and then decreases.  
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H 5: Mayor’s elected times will affect the financial performance in local government. 
3.6 Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman 
 
Lawmakers watch mayor and local government. They become to know the role of mayor. 
They experienced and leaned the mechanism of local council and government, too. 
Organization learning is a form of informational updating through which decision-makers 
develop an understanding of relationships between organization actions and outcomes (Levitt 
and March 1988; Fiol and Lyles 1985). It is similar to the relationship between outside CEO 
and inside CEO in the enterprise. Outsiders are those hired from outside the firm, and insiders 
are those promoted from within the firm. Outsiders are more likely to initiate change 
(Giambatista, Rowe and Riaz, 2005). On the other hand, insiders are more committed to the 
preservation of the status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson, 1993). 
H 6: Mayor’s political experience as a lawmaker will affect the financial performance in local 
government.  
3.7 The Change of Mayor before the Termination of his or her Office  
 
Mayor can be changed before the termination of his or her office because mayor resigns for 
several reasons. It’s their decision to run for a member of the national assembly or for 
governor. Sometimes mayor resigns because of a judgment of a conviction.  
CEO’s cases in enterprise are a little different. But many scholars stated on this issue. CEO 
changes are typically associated with a reduction in the value of the firm.  
Lieberson and O'Connor (1972) in a widely cited study, compare the impact of leadership 
changes on performance after controlling for yearly, industry and company influences. Using 
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profits, sales and profitability as their dependent performance variables, the authors found 
that environmental (macroeconomic) and organizational (prior performance) variables 
explained much more of the variance in performance than did leadership. 
The choice of CEO is a key organizational decision with important implications for 
organization (Datta and Guthrie, 1994). Because of the CEO’s impact on the organization, 
CEO succession is considered to be different from the turnover at lower levels.  
H 7: The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office will affect the financial 
performance in local government.  
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IV. METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1 Data collection 
 
In spite of an enormous amount of discussion about leadership in public organization, there 
has been relatively little broad-scale empirical analysis. Specially, there were little statistical 
approaches to assess the leadership performance. Paper-and-pencil questionnaires have been 
the dominant means of measurement of leadership for most of the construct’s development 
throughout the 20th century and into the present. The interview is just a popular technique 
used in gathering information and data pertaining to leadership, particularly in the 
organizational setting. However, paper-and-pencil questionnaires are limited for an objective 
mayoral evaluation. 
 
In this paper, mayors of local municipalities in Korea are tested. There are 230 mayors in 
local municipalities in Korea. This study uses the data from biographic intelligence and to 
classify into small groups like profession, political party, age, educational background, 
elected times, ex-assemblyman and change of mayor. The biographic intelligence of mayors 
comes from Dong-a Daily News biographic intelligence and National Election Commission. 
 
4.2 Mayor’s specific characters in local government 
 
Table 1: Mayor’s Career Experience  
Career Officials Politicians Businessmen Professional Total 
Mayors 111 49 47 23 230 
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Most of mayors had their job before taking their position. Lots of public officials tried to be a 
mayor after their retirement. Some Politicians, who was a lawmaker in congress or local 
assembly, lawmaker’s aide and employees in political parties, wanted to be a mayor. And 
many businessmen also want to be a politician. Sometimes medical doctors, pharmacists and 
attorneys want to take part in city administration. Some of mayors had several jobs before 
taking their position. In this case,  
 
Table 2: Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
Party Grand 
National 
Party 
Democratic 
Party 
Liberty 
Forward 
Party 
Independent Total 
Mayors 151 41 7 31 230 
 
Political parties have their own propensity in policy and local governance. Mayors are 
affected by their party’s policies, because Parties controls their mayors. Grand National Party 
is more conservative than Democratic Party. GNP is friendly to the market. Liberty forward 
party is also a conservative party. Independent mayors show their character in governance.  
 
Table 3: Mayor’s Age Group 
Age Group 41~50 years 51~60 years Over 61 years Total 
Mayors 40 121 69 230 
 
For the policy the age is important issue. The older mayor has many experiences and they use 
them for cities. But the younger mayors have passion and ambition. They can easily drive 
their works. Their differences give affection on their outputs.  
20 
 
 
Table 4: Mayor’s Educational background 
Educational 
Background 
Under high 
school 
graduation 
Over high 
school 
graduation 
~Bachelor 
Master Ph. D. Total 
Mayors 33 83 76 38 230 
 
Educational background is an important factor to mayor valuation. Citizens are in constant 
search of capable managers who will increase city value and the level of welfare policy. If the 
mayor took a good educational background, for example PhD degree, the educational 
background could effect on the effectiveness of management. It can address the efficacy of 
higher education. Therefore, one of the few mayor characteristics that are publicly available 
is the mayor’s educational background.  
 
Table 5: Mayor’s Elected Times 
Elected Times First Time Second Time Third Time Total 
Mayors 125 82 23 230 
 
The elected times for the mayor can be an important factor for the effectiveness of 
management. Mayor’s term is 4 years. During his previous term in office he learned how to 
manage the public administration. He can do his plans permanently and build long-term 
projects for the city. On the contrary, mayor can fall into mannerism in the third term. His or 
her previous term can be a medicine or a poison.  
 
21 
 
 
Table 6: Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman 
Political Experience Non-Assemblymen Ex-Assemblymen Total 
Mayors 165 65 230 
 
Ex-Assemblymen have worked for municipal government. They experienced naturally in the 
period of assemblyman and know how to manage the local government. They watched the 
mistakes of an executive organization and the case of success in public projects. The period 
of assemblyman is a training course for mayor.  
 
Table 7: The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
The change of mayor Non-Change Change Total 
Mayors 200 30 230 
 
If a mayor was changed while in office, the municipality could lose a sense of stability. The 
change of governance means the alteration of public plan and management team and long-
term plan of the city could be spoiled. Mayor change could be a negative effect on the 
municipality management.  
 
4.3 Tools for Evaluating the Ability of Mayors 
 
Evaluating mayors mainly focused on the ability of financial management. As a role of CEO, 
mayors should manage the finance of municipalities. In this paper the lower level of local 
government, municipal cities (Si), rural districts (Gun) and autonomous urban districts (Gu), 
will be treated.  
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The financial size of municipalities (lower local level) is like a middle-size company in Korea. 
The budget of it is from about 600,000 million to over 200,000 million won in a year.  
 
Evaluated tools for mayor’ performances are divided into 4 parts. First, the fiscal soundness 
in local municipalities means a balance between expenditures and revenues. Second, the 
efficiency of local public finance indicates the ability of mayor’s management skill. The 
efficiency in public sector is to increase efficiency in allocation of resources, to empower 
local governments, and to grow regional economy. Third, the financial planning quality in 
local municipality shows their level of financial planning ability.  
 
The Fiscal Soundness in Local Governments 
The fiscal soundness means that a fiscal body maintains in a sound manner. It mentions the 
balance between expenditures and revenues and managing the expenditures within the limit 
of the revenues. The financial balance is a significant responsibility to local mayor. He or she 
should be accountable for promoting autonomous and sound operation of fiscal policies in 
local municipality. The principle of responsibility refers to disciplined budget execution 
within the appropriated amount. In generally, fiscal soundness takes on the basic principle of 
modern budget execution.  
 
The Efficiency of Local Public Finance 
The goal of financial efficiency in local government is to increase effectiveness in allocation 
of resources to empower local governments and to grow regional economy. Most of the local 
municipalities have been required to find more effective financial ways to manage financial 
problems which they are faced. Local municipalities should not only operate their finance 
23 
 
efficiently but also secure local finance. Fiscal decentralization in expenditure was measured 
by a ratio of own business budget and it means that local government’s prudence in 
expenditure of their own business. Mayors should be required to manage the efficiency of 
public finance in local municipalities. It is their authority and responsibility. The mayor’ 
fiscal ability encourages autonomously fund-raising and increasing usable ratio of local taxies 
for free purpose. 
 
The Financial Planning in Local Governments 
The financial planning is a way to evaluate the accord between the plan and the budget in 
local government. If the local municipality plans public development projects, the eternity of 
the projects is an important factor for the success. Mayor builds the mid-term financial plan 
and tries to make accordance with the comprehensive plan, the investment review system and 
budget. However, the financial planning process is often not open to stakeholders. The 
development plan includes a list of projects proposed by public officials without a thorough 
review process and inefficient investment decisions are made. There are limitations when 
incorporating the comprehensive plan into the financial plan because the comprehensive plan 
is too abstract and unrealistic. The allocation of financial resources among various sectors 
and the timing of projects should be determined, because the medium-term financial plan 
should deal with multi-year investment projects, excluding various expenses. The mayor 
needs strategic abilities to manage financial status in local municipality for the mid and long 
term.  
 
The Other Issues for Evaluating Mayor’s Abilities 
The other indexes are Integrity Assessment and the education and training expenditures. 
These indexes are important factors to manage both public and private organization. They are 
24 
 
tools for evaluating ethical management and the human resource management. Ethical 
management is the key to health for the public organization and sustained organizational 
growth and performance. The investment in education and training is a strategic human 
resource management for public organization. 
 
  
25 
 
 
V. DATA ANALYSIS  
 
5.1 The Fiscal Soundness in Local Governments 
 
5.1.1 The Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio 
 
The fiscal self-reliance ratio is calculated as a proportion of internal financing revenue to total 
revenue. It is one of the most significant indicators standing for the financial status of local 
governments. Central government provides financial aid to local governments because of 
their dependent financial structure. Special grant from central government takes a key role as 
a policy instrument to deal with the problems. However, local governments should have to 
pursue their financial independence against the central government and it is an important role 
to mayors. The ratio measures how independent the local governments are from the central 
government’s subsidies. A high ratio means a good financial state. Mayors should work at 
rational spending under cautious budgetary strategies to match earnings and expenses. In this 
thesis, the fiscal self-reliance ratio is assessed by the average of annually change rate on the 
fiscal self-reliance ratio by the data of Ministry of Public Administration and Security 
(MOPAS) from 2006 to 2010.  
 
Table 8: The Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Career Experience  
Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
1.006630288 0.997243367 1.004608723 1.000645348 
 
The change rates of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio are almost the same. There are no differences 
among each mayor’s group score. Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio is a difficult index to be changed 
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because mayors could not increase or decrease financial status for short period. . Fiscal Self-
Reliance Ratio partly means a kind of residents’ wealth barometer in the region.  
 
 
Table 9: Statistical Significance Test about the Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 10: The Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Political Spectrum 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
0.996330265 1.007923659 1.027269857 1.028087452 
 
Political spectrums didn’t effect on the fiscal self-reliance ratio. There are no differences 
among each mayor’s group score. Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio partly means a kind of residents’ 
wealth barometer in the region. Whatever may be party, their political spectrums didn’t mean.  
 
 
 
ANOVA
RELIANCE
.006 3 .002 .675 .568
.658 226 .003
.664 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 11: Statistical Significance Test about the Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance 
Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 12: The Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Age group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
1.00069585 1.002727785 1.006876 
 
Mayors’ age didn’t effect on the fiscal self-reliance ratio. There are no differences among 
each mayor’s group score. 
 
Table 13: Statistical Significance Test about the Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance 
Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
ANOVA
RELIANCE
.017 1 .017 6.016 .015
.647 228 .003
.664 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
RELIANCE
.000 2 .000 .022 .979
.664 227 .003
.664 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 14: The Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Educational background 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
1.024886788 1.003903759 0.998340605 0.995083632 
 
 
Mayors’ educational background didn’t effect on the fiscal self-reliance ratio. There are no 
differences among each mayor’s group score. 
 
Table 15: Statistical Significance Test about the Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance 
Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 16: The Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Elected Times 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
0.999281248 1.008232841 1.010743087 
ANOVA
RELIANCE
.032 3 .011 3.832 .011
.632 226 .003
.664 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Mayors’ elected times didn’t effect on the fiscal self-reliance ratio. There are no differences 
among each mayor’s group score. 
 
 
Table 17: Statistical Significance Test about the Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance 
Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 18: The Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblyman Ex-Assemblyman 
1.004994545 1.000126769 
Mayors’ experience as a member of local council didn’t effect on the fiscal self-reliance ratio. 
There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA
RELIANCE
.000 2 .000 .056 .946
.663 227 .003
.664 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 19: Statistical Significance Test about the Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance 
Ratio through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
Table 20: The Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance Ratio through Analysis on The change 
of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
1.00072415 1.022917 
 
The change of mayor didn’t effect on the fiscal self-reliance ratio. There are no differences 
among each mayor’s group score. 
 
Table 21: Statistical Significance Test about the Effort Index of Fiscal Self-Reliance 
Ratio through Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her 
office 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
RELIANCE
.000 1 .000 .001 .970
.664 228 .003
.664 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
RELIANCE
.007 1 .007 2.579 .110
.656 228 .003
.664 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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5.1.2 The degree of the local government’s financial independence 
 
The degree of the local government’s financial independence is a portion of independent 
revenue to total revenue. Independent revenue is composed of internal financing (local tax 
and non-ordinary taxable income amount) and revenue for undetermined purposes from 
central government (exchequer equalization grants, financial conserved amount and 
adjustment grant). A high ratio means a good financial state for mayors to manage more 
budgets at their mind. Mayors should work at securing more internal financing and receiving 
more revenue for undetermined purposes. Rational spending under cautious budgetary 
strategies is also a duty of mayors to match earnings and expenses. In this thesis, the 
evaluating index is assessed by the average of annually change rate on the degree of the local 
government’s financial independence by the data of Ministry of Public Administration and 
Security (MOPAS) from 2006 to 2010.  
 
Table 22: The degree of the local government’s financial independence through Analysis 
on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
0.97497264 0.962360102 0.975949064 0.974417043 
 
The degree change rates of the local government’s financial independence are almost the 
same. Profession didn’t effect on the degree of local government’s financial independence. 
There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, profession is 
meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
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Table 23: Statistical Significance Test about the degree of the local government’s 
financial independence through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 24: The degree of the local government’s financial independence through Analysis 
on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
0.970917119 0.973420561 0.977181143 0.977413226 
 
The results are almost the same. Party didn’t effect on the degree of local government’s 
financial independence. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, 
party is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
ANOVA
AUTONOMY
.006 3 .002 2.804 .041
.171 226 .001
.177 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 25: Statistical Significance Test about the degree of the local government’s 
financial independence through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 26: The degree of the local government’s financial independence through Analysis 
on Mayor’s Age group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
0.9693318 0.974192256 0.971134362 
 
The results are almost the same. Mayors’ age didn’t effect on the degree of local 
government’s financial independence. There are no differences among each mayor’s group 
score. Therefore, age is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 27: Statistical Significance Test about the degree of the local government’s 
financial independence through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
AUTONOMY
.001 1 .001 1.301 .255
.176 228 .001
.177 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
AUTONOMY
.001 2 .000 .564 .570
.176 227 .001
.177 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 28: The degree of the local government’s financial independence through Analysis 
on Mayor’s Educational background 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
0.985490424 0.971486711 0.970622395 0.966761132 
 
 
The results are almost the same. Mayors’ educational background didn’t effect on the degree 
of local government’s financial independence. There are no differences among each mayor’s 
group score. Therefore, educational background is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ 
financial performance.  
 
 
Table 29: Statistical Significance Test about the degree of the local government’s 
financial independence through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
 
ANOVA
AUTONOMY
.007 3 .002 3.178 .025
.170 226 .001
.177 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 30: The degree of the local government’s financial independence through Analysis 
on Mayor’s Elected Times 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
0.971780792 0.975109488 0.966401261 
 
The results are almost the same. Mayors’ elected times didn’t effect on the degree of local 
government’s financial independence. There are no differences among each mayor’s group 
score. Therefore, elected times is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
 
Table 31: Statistical Significance Test about the degree of the local government’s 
financial independence through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
Table 32: The degree of the local government’s financial independence through Analysis 
on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblyman Ex-Assemblyman 
0.972003085 0.973512262 
 
The results are almost the same. Mayors’ political experience didn’t effect on the degree of 
local government’s financial independence. There are no differences among each mayor’s 
ANOVA
AUTONOMY
.001 2 .001 .954 .387
.176 227 .001
.177 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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group score. Therefore, political experience is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ 
financial performance.  
 
 
Table 33: Statistical Significance Test about the degree of the local government’s 
financial independence through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an 
Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 34: The degree of the local government’s financial independence through Analysis 
on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
0.971770375 0.976824367 
 
The results are almost the same. The change of mayor didn’t effect on the degree of local 
government’s financial independence. There are no differences among each mayor’s group 
score. Therefore, the change of mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
 
 
ANOVA
AUTONOMY
.000 1 .000 .137 .712
.177 228 .001
.177 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 35: Statistical Significance Test about the degree of the local government’s 
financial independence through Analysis on The change of mayor before the 
termination of his or her office 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
5.1.3 Increasing rate of Internal Financing 
 
The ratio of internal financing is proportion of received amount to closing amount. The 
municipal internal financing is composed of local tax and non-ordinary taxable income 
amount. The local taxes are essential revenue sources of local government and are collected 
by local municipalities. Local taxes are acquisition tax, property tax, registration & license 
tax, regional resource & facility tax, motor vehicle tax, resident tax, local income tax, local 
consumption tax, tobacco consumption tax, leisure tax and local education tax. Non-ordinary 
taxable incomes amount are user charges, rents, fees and so on. Non-ordinary taxable income 
plays a vital role in financing local governments since it is self-financed revenue like local 
taxes. Local municipalities can control non-ordinary taxable income amount at their 
willingness, however, it is difficult to forecast accurately the size of it. The index of internal 
financing demonstrates the municipal’s capacity to make money on its own duty and the 
financial stable condition to grow. The aptitude of mayor was assessed to increase local tax 
and non-ordinary taxable income amount. In this thesis, the internal Financing is calculated 
the average of annually change rate on internal financing by the data of Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security (MOPAS) from 2006 to 2010.  
ANOVA
AUTONOMY
.001 1 .001 .861 .355
.177 228 .001
.177 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 36: Increasing rate of Internal Financing through Analysis on Mayor’s Career 
Experience  
Public Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
7.853477477 8.24155102 8.193223404 7.707217391 
 
The internal financing is composed of local tax and income and it is a kind of index which 
shows their effort for increasing budget. Politicians and Businessmen made more effort for 
internal financing than other career groups. Businessmen are basically good at collecting 
more money. However, it is an interesting result that politicians makes effort to make more 
money. On the other hand public officials and professionals are weak at securing more money.  
 
 
Table 37: Statistical Significance Test about Increasing rate of Internal Financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
 
ANOVA
SELFTAX
31.155 3 10.385 .419 .739
5595.815 226 24.760
5626.969 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 38: Increasing rate of Internal Financing through Analysis on Mayor’s Political 
Spectrum 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
8.21231457 7.191170732 7.282857143 8.130387097 
 
Mayors who belong to a ruling party, Grand National Party, take more local tax and non-
ordinary taxable income amount. The opposition parties, Democratic Party and Liberty 
Forward Party, get fewer incomes. Gap between GNP and DP are 12.5% points. GNP’s 
mayors are close to the central government, therefore they make more internal financing.  
 
Table 39: Statistical Significance Test about Increasing rate of Internal Financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 40: Increasing rate of Internal Financing through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
8.1471 7.737632231 8.344666667 
Older mayors make more internal financing.  
ANOVA
SELFTAX
22.000 1 22.000 .895 .345
5604.969 228 24.583
5626.969 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 41: Statistical Significance Test about Increasing rate of Internal Financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 42: Increasing rate of Internal Financing through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Educational background 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
9.779030303 7.591656627 7.796052632 7.700105263 
 
Mayors who graduated under high school extraordinarily take high score in educational 
background part. They take more 25.4% points than any other mayors. It is an interesting 
result. In this result, educational background didn’t effect on the internal financing. The 
contrary is rather to be supposed. 
 
 
 
ANOVA
SELFTAX
41.506 2 20.753 .843 .432
5585.463 227 24.606
5626.969 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 43: Statistical Significance Test about Increasing rate of Internal Financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 44: Increasing rate of Internal Financing through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected 
Times 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
7.656668 8.426878049 8.253565217 
 
Mayors who are elected more twice earn local tax and non-ordinary taxable income amount. 
It could be a half-baked result that they have more ability to make money. However, during 
their previous term in office they could learn how to manage financial administration. 
 
Table 45: Statistical Significance Test about Increasing rate of Internal Financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
SELFTAX
191.410 3 63.803 2.653 .049
5435.559 226 24.051
5626.969 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
SELFTAX
58.365 2 29.183 1.190 .306
5568.604 227 24.531
5626.969 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 46: Increasing rate of Internal Financing through Analysis on Mayor’s Political 
Experience as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblyman Ex-Assemblyman 
7.799124242 8.477907692 
 
Mayors who experience the role of lawmaker take more score for internal financing. They 
naturally learned the process of financial system in local government in the period of 
assemblyman. Their experiences helped to retain more income.  
 
Table 47: Statistical Significance Test about Increasing rate of Internal Financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 48: Increasing rate of Internal Financing through Analysis on The change of 
mayor before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
7.93235 8.38165 
 
If a mayor was changed while in office, it is presumed that the municipality could lose a 
sense of stability. However, the result in internal financing is reverse. Local government in 
ANOVA
SELFTAX
34.136 1 34.136 1.392 .239
5592.833 228 24.530
5626.969 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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which mayors were changed collect more internal financing. Therefore, the relation between 
leadership change and internal financing is meaningless.  
 
 
Table 49: Statistical Significance Test about Increasing rate of Internal Financing 
through Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
5.2 The Efficiency of Local Public Finance 
 
5.2.1 The local tax collection rate 
 
The local tax collection rate is the ratio of the amount received to the target amount. The local 
tax revenue plays an important role in the local public financial status because mayors can 
manage budgets at their mind. Therefore, a high ratio means a good financial state for the 
local municipalities. The improvement factors of local tax collection rates are categorized 
into three types as law and institutional arrangement, swift property and bond security and 
correct local tax bill sending. The high ratio is an index to evaluate mayors. In this thesis, the 
evaluating index is assessed by the average of annually change rate on the local tax collection 
from the data of Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) from 2006 to 2010. 
 
ANOVA
SELFTAX
40.555 1 40.555 1.655 .200
5586.414 228 24.502
5626.969 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 50: The local tax collection rate through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
Public Servant Politician Businessman Professional job 
0.998670207 0.999962714 0.999628043 0.999091174 
 
The results are almost the same. The profession of mayor didn’t effect on the local tax 
collection rate. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the 
profession of mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 51: Statistical Significance Test about the local tax collection rate through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 52: The local tax collection rate through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
0.999226185 1.000172488 0.996344286 0.998307903 
 
The results are almost the same. The party of mayor didn’t effect on the local tax collection 
rate. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the party of mayor 
is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
ANOVA
LOCALTAX
.000 3 .000 .421 .738
.008 226 .000
.008 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 53: Statistical Significance Test about the local tax collection rate through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 54: The local tax collection rate through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
0.999668125 0.990959254 0.99896271 
 
The results are almost the same. The age of mayor didn’t effect on the local tax collection rate. 
There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the age of mayor is 
meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 55: Statistical Significance Test about the local tax collection rate through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
LOCALTAX
.001 1 .001 21.545 .000
.008 228 .000
.008 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
LOCALTAX
.000 2 .000 .527 .591
.008 227 .000
.008 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 56: The local tax collection rate through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational 
background 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
0.996995697 0.999315181 0.999900908 0.999360368 
 
The results are almost the same. The educational background of mayor didn’t effect on the 
local tax collection rate. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, 
the educational background of mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
 
Table 57: Statistical Significance Test about Increasing the local tax collection rate 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 58: The local tax collection rate through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
0.999367568 0.998612427 1.000218087 
 
ANOVA
LOCALTAX
.000 3 .000 4.356 .005
.008 226 .000
.008 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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The results are almost the same. The elected times of mayor didn’t effect on the local tax 
collection rate. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the 
elected times of mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
 
Table 59: Statistical Significance Test about the local tax collection rate through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 60: The local tax collection rate through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience 
as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblyman Ex-Assemblyman 
0.999064145 0.999486108 
 
The results are almost the same. The lawmaker experience of mayor didn’t effect on the local 
tax collection rate. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the 
lawmaker experience of mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
 
ANOVA
LOCALTAX
.000 2 .000 1.220 .297
.008 227 .000
.008 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 61: Statistical Significance Test about the local tax collection rate through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 62: The local tax collection rate through Analysis on The change of mayor before 
the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
0.99916328 0.9993175 
 
The results are almost the same. The change of mayor didn’t effect on the local tax collection 
rate. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the change of 
mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 63: Statistical Significance Test about the local tax collection rate through 
Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
ANOVA
LOCALTAX
.000 1 .000 .098 .754
.008 228 .000
.008 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
LOCALTAX
.000 1 .000 3.666 .057
.008 228 .000
.008 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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5.2.2 The ratio of labor cost on internal financing 
 
The ratio of labor cost on internal financing is the proportion of labor cost to internal 
financing. It is one of indexes for financial efficiency in local government. CEOs in the 
corporation make an effort to decrease labor cost. Like that, mayor in local government 
strives to cut down personnel expenditure. Since 2007, the system of human resources affairs 
in local organizations was converted from the standard quota system to the total labor cost 
system to strengthen autonomy of managing organizations. Local government takes more 
power to decrease labor cost and increase internal financing by itself. Mayors should work at 
rational spending under cautious budgetary strategies to cut down public budget. The ratio 
measures how efficient the local governments meet their expenses. A low ratio means a good 
financial state. In this thesis, the ratio index is assessed by the average of annually change 
rate on of labor cost on internal financing by the data of Ministry of Public Administration 
and Security (MOPAS) from 2007 to 2010.  
 
Table 64: The ratio of labor cost on internal financing through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Career Experience  
Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
1.008463766 1.001188286 1.019483191 1.04053187 
 
The results were almost the same. Mayor’s profession didn’t effect on the ratio of labor cost 
on internal financing. There were few differences and tendencies among each mayor’s group 
score. Therefore, profession of mayor is a meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
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Table 65: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of labor cost on internal financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 66: The ratio of labor cost on internal financing through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Political Spectrum 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
1.008755517 1.011064683 0.997608143 1.035053387 
The results were almost the same. Mayor’s political spectrum didn’t effect on the ratio of 
labor cost on internal financing. There were few differences and tendencies among each 
mayor’s group score. Therefore, political spectrum of mayor is a meaningless factor to 
evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 67: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of labor cost on internal financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
SELFBUD
.028 3 .009 1.655 .178
1.295 226 .006
1.323 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
SELFBUD
.006 1 .006 .995 .319
1.317 228 .006
1.323 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 68: The ratio of labor cost on internal financing through Analysis on Mayor’s Age 
group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
1.017832625 1.01201862 1.009827377 
 
The results were almost the same. Mayor’s age didn’t effect on the ratio of labor cost on 
internal financing. There were few differences and tendencies among each mayor’s group 
score. Therefore, age of mayor is a meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
 
Table 69: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of labor cost on internal financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 70: The ratio of labor cost on internal financing through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Educational background 
 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
1.000499394 1.024325349 1.012035092 0.997249895 
 
ANOVA
SELFBUD
.002 2 .001 .142 .868
1.321 227 .006
1.323 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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The results were almost the same. Mayor’s educational background didn’t effect on the ratio 
of labor cost on internal financing. There were few differences and tendencies among each 
mayor’s group score. Therefore, educational background of mayor is a meaningless factor to 
evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 71: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of labor cost on internal financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 72: The ratio of labor cost on internal financing through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Elected Times 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
1.012720008 1.011957402 1.011962565 
 
The results were almost the same. Mayor’s elected times didn’t effect on the ratio of labor 
cost on internal financing. There were few differences and tendencies among each mayor’s 
group score. Therefore, elected times of mayor is a meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ 
financial performance.  
ANOVA
SELFBUD
.025 3 .008 1.463 .225
1.298 226 .006
1.323 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 73: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of labor cost on internal financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 74: The ratio of labor cost on internal financing through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblymen Ex-Assemblymen 
1.0113126 1.015062585 
The results were almost the same. Mayor’s experience as a lawmaker didn’t effect on the 
ratio of labor cost on internal financing. There were few differences and tendencies among 
each mayor’s group score. Therefore, experience as a lawmaker of mayor is a meaningless 
factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 75: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of labor cost on internal financing 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
SELFBUD
.000 2 .000 .003 .997
1.323 227 .006
1.323 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
SELFBUD
.001 1 .001 .113 .737
1.322 228 .006
1.323 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 76: The ratio of labor cost on internal financing through Analysis on The change 
of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
1.010978165 1.021667133 
 
The results were almost the same. The change of mayor in the termination of his or her office 
didn’t effect on the ratio of labor cost on internal financing. There were few differences and 
tendencies among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the change of mayor is a 
meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 77: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of labor cost on internal financing 
through Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
5.2.3 The rate of event and festival expenditures 
 
The rate of event and festival expenditures is a portion of event and festival expenditures to 
total expenditures. The local events and festivals financed by local municipalities can 
entertain citizens free of charge and boost up local economy. Almost every local government 
ANOVA
SELFBUD
.003 1 .003 .515 .474
1.320 228 .006
1.323 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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manages their own distinctive event and festival. However, local events and festival have a 
negative side. Local governments which lack of managing ability keep running several 
permanent events and festivals for their voters in the next local election in spite of their 
financial crisis. The current problems of Korean regional festivals are the absence of strategic 
planning, insufficiency of management system, lack of individuality, shortage of local 
residents and the tourists. Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) highly 
recommends local municipalities to decrease the event and festival expenditures. A low ratio 
means a good financial state for the local municipalities. In this thesis, the evaluating index is 
assessed by the average of annually change rate on the rate of event and festival expenditures 
from the data of MOPAS from 2006 to 2010.  
 
 
Table 78: The rate of event and festival expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Career Experience  
 
Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
1.034540018 1.049188408 1.100440064 1.046674609 
 
 
The high-rate of event and festival expenditures is a negative index. Mayors who were 
businessmen spent more budgets for event and festival than other mayors. Other mayors 
made an increase of 4 % over that of last year. However, businessmen made an increase of 10% 
over that of last year.  
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Table 79: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of event and festival expenditures 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 80: The rate of event and festival expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Political Spectrum 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
1.066341166 1.029421854 1.008407714 1.024377645 
 
Members of Grand National Party spent more money for local event and festival. The gap 
between GNP and Democratic Party is almost 4%. It means that Democrats saved more local 
budgets.  
 
Table 81: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of event and festival expenditures 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
ANOVA
EVENT
.145 3 .048 2.377 .071
4.600 226 .020
4.745 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
EVENT
.086 1 .086 4.217 .041
4.659 228 .020
4.745 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 82: The rate of event and festival expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s Age 
group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
1.085076875 1.049752446 1.037902203 
 
Age is a useful factor for passion of mayors. Mayors’ ages had influence on the event and 
festival expenditures of local governments. Younger mayors spent more budgets for event and 
festival. Therefore, age is meaningful factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 83: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of event and festival expenditures 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 84: The rate of event and festival expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Educational background 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
1.048757818 1.034518265 1.059340553 1.080380711 
 
The results were almost the same. Mayors’ educational background didn’t effect on the rate 
of event and festival expenditures. There are no differences and tendencies among each 
ANOVA
EVENT
.058 2 .029 1.406 .247
4.687 227 .021
4.745 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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mayor’s group score. Therefore, educational background is a meaningless factor to evaluate 
mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 85: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of event and festival expenditures 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 86: The rate of event and festival expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Elected Times 
 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
1.053715752 1.043644622 1.075871522 
 
 
The results were almost the same. Mayors’ elected times didn’t effect on the rate of event and 
festival expenditures. There were no differences and tendencies among each mayor’s group 
score. Therefore, elected times is a meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
 
ANOVA
EVENT
.060 3 .020 .971 .407
4.684 226 .021
4.745 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 87: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of event and festival expenditures 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 88: The rate of event and festival expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
Non-Assemblyman Ex-Assemblyman 
1.055864176 1.043396677 
 
 
The results were almost the same. Mayors’ council experiences didn’t effect on the rate of 
event and festival expenditures. There were no differences and tendencies among each 
mayor’s group score. Therefore, council experience is a meaningless factor to evaluate 
mayors’ financial performance.  
 
ANOVA
EVENT
.019 2 .010 .460 .632
4.726 227 .021
4.745 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 89: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of event and festival expenditures 
through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 90: The rate of event and festival expenditures through Analysis on The change of 
mayor before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
1.05530511 1.032578367 
 
The results were almost the same. Leadership change didn’t effect on the rate of event and 
festival expenditures. There were few differences and tendencies among each mayor’s group 
score. Therefore, the change of mayor is a meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
 
Table 91: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of event and festival expenditures 
through Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
EVENT
.007 1 .007 .349 .555
4.738 228 .021
4.745 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
EVENT
.013 1 .013 .649 .421
4.731 228 .021
4.745 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
61 
 
5.2.4 The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector 
 
The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector is a portion of transfer expenditures to 
private sector to total expenditures. The system of local governments’ transfer expenditures to 
private sector is a method which bolsters community activities and local programs. The 
transfer of expenditures to private sector is composed of financial subsidy to private sector, 
the subsidy of civil society organization, the subsidy of nongovernmental event and festival 
and so on. However, the system has a negative side, too. The expenditures could have a bad 
influence on the financial status. If local governments which lack of managing ability keep 
running several permanent events and festivals just for their voters in the next local election, 
they fall into the financial crisis. Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) 
highly recommends local municipalities to decrease the transfer rate of expenditures to 
private sector. A low ratio means a good financial state for the local municipalities. In this 
thesis, the evaluating index is assessed by the average of annually change rate on the transfer 
rate of expenditures to private sector from the data of MOPAS from 2006 to 2010.  
 
Table 92: The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Career Experience  
Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
1.110236667 1.054380612 1.048539851 1.019112957 
 
The result was various. The high transfer rate of expenditures to private sector means a 
negative signal for local government. Officials took relatively a bad score. They spent more 
budget than others. Professionals were in a conservative situation in expenditures to private 
sector.  
62 
 
 
 
Table 93: Statistical Significance Test about the transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 94: The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
1.067229649 1.159203463 1.004025714 1.029506194 
 
Mayors who belong to Democratic Party spent more budgets than other parties. Conservative 
parties got less effort for expenditures to private sector than progressive party. The gap 
between Grand National Party and DP are 9.2% points.  
 
 
ANOVA
TRANSPRI
.263 3 .088 .976 .405
20.286 226 .090
20.548 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 95: Statistical Significance Test about the transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 96: The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Age group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
1.048920175 1.069783347 1.104656507 
 
The older mayors were, the more they spent the budget for expenditures to private sector. The 
gap between forties and sixties was more 5% points. Older men have more experience and 
they can do their job better. On the contrary, they tend to be corrupt.  
 
Table 97: Statistical Significance Test about the transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
TRANSPRI
.039 1 .039 .431 .512
20.510 228 .090
20.548 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
TRANSPRI
.091 2 .045 .503 .606
20.458 227 .090
20.548 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
64 
 
 
Table 98: The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Educational background 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
1.032923 1.047495627 1.165495421 1.000411658 
 
Mayor’s educational background is also an important factor for expenditures to private sector. 
However, there are few influences in educational background. The older mayors were, the 
more they spent the budget for expenditures to private sector from under high school 
graduation to master degree. However, mayors who have received Ph D degree spent less for 
private sector.  
 
Table 99: Statistical Significance Test about the transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 100: The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Elected Times 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
1.054260048 1.116425195 1.056196478 
 
ANOVA
TRANSPRI
.954 3 .318 3.669 .013
19.594 226 .087
20.548 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
65 
 
Mayors, who served in first or third term, took less point. On the contrary, mayors, who 
served in second term, took relatively more point. The transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector is a negative index in the evaluation. It could be possible to presume that mayor in 
second term fell into mannerism.  
 
Table 101: Statistical Significance Test about the transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 102: The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
 
Non-Assemblyman Ex-Assemblyman 
1.086913339 1.050479846 
 
 
 
ANOVA
TRANSPRI
.202 2 .101 1.127 .326
20.346 227 .090
20.548 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
66 
 
The mayors, who served as assemblymen in national assembly or local council, spent less 
point. Ex-assemblymen had experience for managing municipality as observers. However, it 
didn’t mean in this section.  
 
Table 103: Statistical Significance Test about the transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 104: The transfer rate of expenditures to private sector through Analysis on The 
change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
 
Non-Change Change 
1.081983665 1.0408386 
 
The change of mayor is a little meaningful on the transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector. The local government, which are not changed their power system, spent more 4.11% 
point budget for expenditures to private sector.  
 
 
ANOVA
TRANSPRI
.062 1 .062 .689 .407
20.486 228 .090
20.548 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 105: Statistical Significance Test about the transfer rate of expenditures to private 
sector through Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her 
office 
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
 
5.3 The Financial Planning in Local Governments 
 
5.3.1 The ratio of budget execution 
 
The ratio of budget execution is a proportion of budget execution to financial planning in 
local government. Mayors can influence and control the budgetary execution of local 
government. It is their official duty and task. The ratio of budget execution measure how 
exactly the local governments observe their fiscal plan which they made one year before. The 
ratio of budget execution means the conformity of short-term financial plan. A high ratio 
means a good financial state. In this thesis, the ratio of budget execution is annually assessed 
by the data of Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) from 2008 to 2010. 
And the ratio is an average of ratio for 3 years. 
 
ANOVA
TRANSPRI
.044 1 .044 .491 .484
20.504 228 .090
20.548 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
68 
 
Table 106: The ratio of budget execution through Analysis on Mayor’s Career 
Experience  
Officials Politician Businessmen Professionals 
79.12391874 80.83190469 79.24939723 79.37826174 
 
The results were almost the same. The profession of mayor didn’t effect on the ratio of 
budget execution. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the 
profession of mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
Table 107: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of budget execution through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 108: The ratio of budget execution through Analysis on Mayor’s Political 
Spectrum 
 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
80.21273762 78.61910512 76.14619 78.23903161 
 
ANOVA
BUDGET
105.569 3 35.190 1.330 .265
5980.756 226 26.464
6086.325 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
69 
 
 
Political parties have their own propensity in policy and local governance. Mayors are 
affected by their party’s policies, because Parties controls their mayors. Grand National Party 
was a ruling party. GNP was friendly to central government and became to observe its 
policies. GNP’s score was higher than other parties.  
 
 
Table 109: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of budget execution through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 110: The ratio of budget execution through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
79.71666575 79.8170524 78.94797145 
 
The results were almost the same. The age of mayor didn’t effect on the ratio of budget 
execution. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the age of 
mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
ANOVA
BUDGET
199.631 1 199.631 7.732 .006
5886.695 228 25.819
6086.325 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 111: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of budget execution through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 112: The ratio of budget execution through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational 
background 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
77.81020212 79.26399578 80.07372803 80.57074605 
 
There was a trend between mayor’s educational background and the ratio of budget execution. 
The more mayors took high degree, the more they observed the ratio of budget execution.  
 
Table 113: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of budget execution through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
ANOVA
BUDGET
34.720 2 17.360 .651 .522
6051.605 227 26.659
6086.325 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
BUDGET
167.088 3 55.696 2.127 .098
5919.238 226 26.191
6086.325 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
71 
 
 
Table 114: The ratio of budget execution through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
79.8148664 78.90743939 80.29007261 
 
 
The results were almost the same. The elected times of mayor didn’t effect on the ratio of 
budget execution. There are no differences and trends among each mayor’s group score. 
Therefore, the elected times of mayor is meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial 
performance.  
 
Table 115: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of budget execution through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
ANOVA
BUDGET
55.195 2 27.597 1.039 .356
6031.131 227 26.569
6086.325 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
72 
 
Table 116: The ratio of budget execution through Analysis on Mayor’s Political 
Experience as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblymen Ex-Assemblymen 
79.81266655 78.84384646 
 
The results were almost the same. The gap between mayors who were ex-assemblymen and 
non-assemblymen was below 1% points.  
 
Table 117: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of budget execution through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 118: The ratio of budget execution through Analysis on The change of mayor 
before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
79.615025 79.03116667 
 
The results were almost the same. The change of mayor didn’t affect on the ratio of budget 
execution.  
 
 
ANOVA
BUDGET
43.768 1 43.768 1.651 .200
6042.557 228 26.502
6086.325 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
73 
 
 
Table 119: Statistical Significance Test about the ratio of budget execution through 
Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
5.3.2 The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning 
 
The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning is a portion of budget execution 
to mid-term financial planning in local government. The ratio of mid-term financial plan 
means an index of financial planning management. Mid-term financial plan is a system to 
overcome the limit of annual budget plan and to review the process of rational allocation of 
resources for the financial business in the region. Mayor takes a significant role to make an 
efficient operation and reasonable financial management of mid-term financial plan. His 
other role is to mediate between the central and the local government in order to improve the 
ratio of mid-term financial plan. The ratio of mid-term financial plan is calculated by the ratio 
of working expense to mid-term financial planning expense. A high ratio means a good 
financial state for the local municipalities. In this thesis, the evaluating index is assessed by 
the average of annually change rate on the ratio of mid-term financial plan from the data of 
MOPAS from 2006 to 2010.  
ANOVA
BUDGET
8.893 1 8.893 .334 .564
6077.432 228 26.655
6086.325 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
74 
 
 
 
Table 120: The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
104.4767387 107.569102 107.2361064 104.2575652 
 
 
Politicians were ranked in the top of the rate of budget execution on mid-term financial 
planning. Businessmen took the second ranked position. Officials and professionals touched 
the bottom line. The gap between each group is small. However, it could be read that 
politicians and businessmen took more attention on mid-term financial planning.  
 
 
Table 121: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of budget execution on mid-term 
financial planning through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
ANOVA
MIDTERM
495.920 3 165.307 3.656 .013
10217.959 226 45.212
10713.879 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
75 
 
 
 
Table 122: The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
106.907106 103.1434634 100.4297143 104.2245806 
 
Grand National Party was ranked in the top of the rate of budget execution on mid-term 
financial planning. Independent mayors took the second ranked position. The gap between 
GNP and Democratic Party was more 3% point. However, it could be read that GNP’s 
mayors took more attention on mid-term financial planning than DP mayors. GNP was a 
ruling party and his mayors observed the central government policies.  
 
Table 123: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of budget execution on mid-term 
financial planning through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
ANOVA
MIDTERM
664.675 1 664.675 15.080 .000
10049.204 228 44.075
10713.879 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 124: The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
107.28215 104.984438 105.9626377 
 
Younger mayors took more percentage on the rate of budget execution on mid-term financial 
planning.  
 
Table 125: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of budget execution on mid-term 
financial planning through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 126: The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
106.2897576 104.7727349 106.2442895 105.9884211 
 
There was no rule for result tendency.  
 
ANOVA
MIDTERM
166.727 2 83.363 1.794 .169
10547.153 227 46.463
10713.879 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
77 
 
Table 127: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of budget execution on mid-term 
financial planning through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 128: The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
105.816888 105.3190244 106.198 
 
The elected times of mayor was a little meaningful on the rate of budget execution on mid-
term financial planning. First and second, third elected mayors took similar points.  
 
Table 129: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of budget execution on mid-term 
financial planning through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
ANOVA
MIDTERM
108.403 3 36.134 .770 .512
10605.477 226 46.927
10713.879 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
MIDTERM
19.197 2 9.599 .204 .816
10694.682 227 47.113
10713.879 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
78 
 
 
Table 130: The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblyman Ex-Assemblyman 
105.1150848 107.1051692 
 
The gap between ex-lawmaker and non-lawmaker was 2% point. Mayors who were a 
lawmaker in local or national assembly observed more the mid-term financial plan. Their 
official experience affected on mayor’s financial decisions.  
 
Table 131: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of budget execution on mid-term 
financial planning through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an 
Assemblyman  
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 132: The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning through 
Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
106.02065 103.3898333 
 
 
ANOVA
MIDTERM
184.677 1 184.677 3.999 .047
10529.202 228 46.181
10713.879 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
79 
 
The change of mayor affected on the rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning. 
Mayors who didn’t their position in the termination of office took more 2.6% point. It is 
proved that the change of mayors affected on the financial stability. The change of 
governance means the alteration of public plan and management team and long-term plan of 
the city could be spoiled.  
 
Table 133: Statistical Significance Test about the rate of budget execution on mid-term 
financial planning through Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of 
his or her office 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
 
5.3.3 The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment 
 
The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment is the proportion of budget 
formulation in the next fiscal year to reviewed public works for loan & investment in this 
fiscal year. The ratio of budget execution measure how exactly the local governments observe 
their fiscal plan which they made one year before for reviewed public works for loan & 
investment. The rate is one of the financial planning indexes in local government. However, a 
review system in local government for investment and loan is considered inefficient because 
of its systemic and methodological short-comings and bureaucratization of the reviewing 
ANOVA
MIDTERM
180.553 1 180.553 3.908 .049
10533.326 228 46.199
10713.879 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
80 
 
process. It failed to realize the goals of the original review system for investment and loan. 
Because fields of business have changed, thus it is necessary to recalculate weight factor for 
each field. Improving the investment and loan review system becomes one of the most 
important tasks of the local finance. Mayors can influence and control it. In this thesis, the 
budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment is annually assessed by the data 
of Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) from 2006 to 2010. And the 
ratio is an average of ratio for 5 years. 
 
Table 134: The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
60.31188739 56.92697959 60.87478723 66.36321739 
 
Professionals were ranked on the first stage in the budge rate of reviewed public works for 
loan & investment. Officials and businessmen took almost same points. Politicians touched 
the bottom.  
 
Table 135: Statistical Significance Test about the budge rate of reviewed public works 
for loan & investment through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
ANOVA
INVEST
1418.542 3 472.847 .885 .449
20705.629 226 534.096
22124.171 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
81 
 
 
Table 136: The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
55.61756623 69.33107317 62.51114286 70.74535484 
 
Democratic Party observed more than Grand National Party on the budge rate of reviewed 
public works for loan & investment. The rate was more 13.7% points. DP was an opposition 
party. GNP’s mayors ignored the budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment.  
 
Table 137: Statistical Significance Test about the budge rate of reviewed public works 
for loan & investment through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 138: The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
60.69795 59.40211983 61.68023188 
 
ANOVA
INVEST
9683.746 1 9683.746 19.636 .000
12440.425 228 493.160
22124.171 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
82 
 
The results were almost the same. Mayor’s age didn’t effect on the budge rate of reviewed 
public works for loan & investment. There were few differences and tendencies among each 
mayor’s group score. Therefore, the age of mayor is a meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ 
financial performance.  
 
Table 139: Statistical Significance Test about the budge rate of reviewed public works 
for loan & investment through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 140: The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
62.14054545 60.68649398 59.16423684 60.19503947 
 
The results were almost the same. Mayor’s educational background didn’t effect on the budge 
rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment. There were few differences and 
tendencies among each mayor’s group score. Therefore, the educational background of mayor 
is a meaningless factor to evaluate mayors’ financial performance.  
 
ANOVA
INVEST
235.304 2 117.652 .219 .803
21888.867 227 536.955
22124.171 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
83 
 
 
Table 141: Statistical Significance Test about the budge rate of reviewed public works 
for loan & investment through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 142: The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
First Time Second Time Third Time 
57.892056 62.91980488 64.15563043 
The more mayors were elected, the more they observed the on the budge rate of reviewed 
public works for loan & investment. It was presumed that their official experience affected on 
the results.  
 
Table 143: Statistical Significance Test about the budge rate of reviewed public works 
for loan & investment through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
INVEST
222.617 3 74.206 .138 .937
21901.554 226 539.387
22124.171 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
INVEST
1629.459 2 814.730 1.535 .218
20494.712 227 530.814
22124.171 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
84 
 
 
Table 144: The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment through 
Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblymen Ex-Assemblymen 
61.25188182 57.92230769 
 
Mayors who didn’t served as a lawmaker observed more than ex-assemblymen in the budge 
rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment. 
 
Table 145: Statistical Significance Test about the budge rate of reviewed public works 
for loan & investment Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 146: The budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment through 
Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
59.1760775 67.8765 
 
The change of leadership in the termination of office affected on the budge rate of reviewed 
public works for loan & investment. It was opposition result. The local government which 
changed mayor unexpectedly observed more on the budge rate of reviewed public works for 
loan & investment.  
ANOVA
INVEST
516.948 1 516.948 .969 .326
21607.223 228 533.365
22124.171 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
85 
 
 
Table 147: Statistical Significance Test about the budge rate of reviewed public works 
for loan & investment through Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination 
of his or her office 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
 
5.4 The Other Issues for Evaluating Mayor’s Abilities 
 
5.4.1 Integrity Assessment 
 
Corruption is widely considered to be a symptom of poor governance. The integrity 
assessment is an index for ethical management. An accurate assessment of corruption is 
needed to effectively implement anti-corruption policies in local government. Anti-
Corruption and Civil Rights Commission has conducted integrity assessment for the public 
organizations every year since 1999. (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, 2009)  
ACRC’s integrity assessment consists of external and internal integrity. External integrity is 
composed of corruption, transparency and accountability. Internal integrity is divided into 
integrity culture index and work integrity index. Only external integrity will be argued in this 
thesis because internal integrity data are not enough for the analysis. 
The corruption index means the level of corruption such as the acceptance of gratuities, 
entertainment or convenience. The transparency index refers to the degree to which public 
ANOVA
INVEST
1974.714 1 1974.714 3.747 .054
20149.457 228 526.971
22124.171 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
86 
 
officials comply with various standards and procedures in a transparent and fair manner. The 
accountability index mentions the level of efforts done by public officials to complete their 
duties according to public service ethics. 
 
The surveyed respondents for external Integrity Assessment were annually about 100,000 
service users. They directly contacted with public organizations or public officials. The 
ACRC received respondent list from target organizations and private pollster companies did 
sampling and carried out external integrity survey through computer aided telephone 
interview. The index is the average of annual numerical value from July 1st 2006 to June 30th 
2010, fourth mayor term.  
 
 
Table 148: Integrity Assessment through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
8.47757509 8.512602041 8.479414915 8.610869565 
 
The maximum integrity assessment index is 10 points and the minimum is 0 point. 
Professionals are ranked in the top of integrity assessment index. Politicians take the second 
ranked position. Public officials and businessmen touch the bottom line. Public officials and 
politicians have a time to make a mind for public during their period in office. Businessmen 
and professionals relatively had no time to take public mind. Therefore, this result shows 
which of the previous job help mayors.  
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Table 149: Statistical Significance Test about Integrity Assessment through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. In this paper, all the results are tested by 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA). A test result is called statistically significant if it is unlikely 
to have occurred by chance alone.  
 
Table 150: Integrity Assessment through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward Party Independent 
8.502052993 8.475182951 8.520357143 8.508897839 
 
Conservative parties get more points for integrity assessment than progressive party. Grand 
national party and Liberty forward party, which are conservative parties, are ranked in the top 
position. Democratic Party gets relatively lower point.  
 
Table 151: Statistical Significance Test about Integrity Assessment through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
INTERGRI
.366 3 .122 1.089 .354
25.301 226 .112
25.667 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
INTERGRI
.005 1 .005 .043 .836
25.662 228 .113
25.667 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 152: Integrity Assessment through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
8.538291675 8.474111587 8.519009667 
 
The age is an important factor for integrity assessment. 51~60 year old mayors get more 
integrity assessment than any other ages. Getting older or younger mayors takes lower points. 
Generally speaking, older men have more experience and they can do their job better. On the 
contrary, they tend to be corrupt.  
 
Table 153: Statistical Significance Test about Integrity Assessment through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Age group 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 154: Integrity Assessment through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
8.484671758 8.504186759 8.524714908 8.447127211 
 
Mayor’s educational background is also an important factor for the integrity assessment. 
However, there are few influences in educational background. Mayors who took bachelor or 
ANOVA
INTERGRI
.164 2 .082 .731 .482
25.502 227 .112
25.667 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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master degree just got more points in integrity assessment. Mayors who took PhD degree got 
relatively lower points.  
 
 
Table 155: Statistical Significance Test about Integrity Assessment through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Educational background 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 156: Integrity Assessment through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
First Term Second Term Third Term 
8.52250668 8.448750012 8.547826087 
 
Mayors, who serve in first or third term, take more points. On the contrary, mayors, who 
serve in second term, take relatively lower points. It could be possible to presume that mayor 
in second term can fall into mannerism.  
 
 
 
ANOVA
INTERGRI
.161 3 .054 .477 .699
25.505 226 .113
25.667 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 157: Statistical Significance Test about Integrity Assessment through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 158: Integrity Assessment through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an 
Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblyman Ex-Assemblyman 
8.496287891 8.504974369 
 
Mayor, who served as an assemblyman in local council or national assembly, takes more 
points.  
 
Table 159: Statistical Significance Test about Integrity Assessment through Analysis on 
Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
ANOVA
INTERGRI
.331 2 .165 1.483 .229
25.336 227 .112
25.667 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
INTERGRI
.004 1 .004 .031 .860
25.663 228 .113
25.667 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 160: Integrity Assessment through Analysis on The change of mayor before the 
termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
8.509437515 8.427444433 
 
The change of mayor influences on the integrity assessment of local governments. Local 
governments, whose mayors were not newly changed, got more points.  
 
Table 161: Statistical Significance Test about Integrity Assessment through Analysis on 
The change of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
5.4.2 The Educational and Training Expenditures 
 
The investment in education and training is a strategic human resource management for 
public organization. It is main factor as for creating a competitive advantage and has 
important effect on public business growth in mid- and long-term. Generally speaking, 
education & training expenses were found to have positively significant effect on firm 
performance and value. It happens alike in public organization. These results indicate that 
municipalities have to increase education and training investment to strengthen the 
competitiveness.  
ANOVA
INTERGRI
.175 1 .175 1.569 .212
25.491 228 .112
25.667 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Therefore education and training expenditures for employee are a kind of index for R&D. 
CEOs, who look ahead into the future, intend to invest in people. People who take a part in 
education or training program in school or research institution can produce more 
effectiveness on their position. The investing in people is brought to fruition in the form of 
the education and training expenditures in a company. It happens in a local government, too. 
The mayor of local government as a CEO of enterprise invests in public officials. The 
education expenditure for public officials means school expenses, tuition fees, docent fees 
and so on. 
 
The situations of individual local governments are different on their number of population, 
financial status, budget and so on. The situation of mayors should be considered. In this paper, 
the educational and training expenditures are calculated the average of effort indexes on the 
ratio of direct education and training expenditures to labor cost by the data of Ministry of 
Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) from 2007 to 2010.  
 
Table 162: The Educational and Training Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Career Experience  
Public Officials Politicians Businessmen Professionals 
1.479415099 1.620502204 2.18618617 1.290082 
 
The numerical values mean mayor’s intention for human management. Businessmen are 
ranked on the first stage in the educational and training expenditures of municipalities. They 
almost doubled the educational and training expenditures than professionals. In generally, 
CEOs are more attentions to human resources, because they need to make outputs in short 
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time. In firm, human power means their good productivity. Mayor’s mind is close to CEOs 
and they intentionally invest in human capital. On the other hand, professionals and public 
officials are weak at business mind.  
 
Table 163: Statistical Significance Test about the Educational and Training 
Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s Career Experience  
 
 
 
Moreover, the result is statistically significant. 
 
Table 164: The Educational and Training Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Political Spectrum 
 
Grand National Party Democratic Party Liberty Forward 
Party 
Independent 
1.653178146 1.776720902 1.356989286 1.421546387 
 
Major parties spent more budgets than minor parties and independent mayors. Grand 
National Party and Democratic Party’s average is 1.679569 and Liberty Forward Party and 
Independent mayor’s is 1.409654. Major parties spent more 19.14% of budget than minor 
parties. Among major parties, Democratic Party spent more budgets for the education and 
ANOVA
EDUFEE
19.712 3 6.571 3.468 .017
428.235 226 1.895
447.948 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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training than Grand National Party. DP’s expenditure is more 12.35% point than GNP’s. 
However, Liberty Forward Party and independent mayor’s expenditures are relatively fewer. 
 
 
Table 165: Statistical Significance Test about the Educational and Training 
Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Spectrum 
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 166: The Educational and Training Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Age group 
 
 
41~50 years old 51~60 years old Over 61 years old 
1.552510675 1.710104066 1.551004362 
 
In this paper, middle-aged mayors made good performances. The value of age for them is 
quite meaningful. Middle-aged mayors spent more 15% point budget for educating and 
training employees for municipal’s future value. On the contrary, the others  
 
ANOVA
EDUFEE
.146 1 .146 .074 .786
447.802 228 1.964
447.948 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 167: Statistical Significance Test about the Educational and Training 
Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s Age group 
 
 
 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
Table 168: The Educational and Training Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Educational background 
 
 
Under high school 
graduation 
Over high school 
graduation ~Bachelor  
Master Ph D 
1.434826788 1.72867141 1.594526921 1.684980605 
 
The more degree is not a necessary factor to invest in human capital. However, the mayors, 
who have attended to college, paid attention to investment in human capital. On the other 
hand mayors, who have educational background under high school graduations, spent fewer 
budget than other mayors.  
ANOVA
EDUFEE
1.442 2 .721 .366 .694
446.506 227 1.967
447.948 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 169: Statistical Significance Test about the Educational and Training 
Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s Educational background 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 170: The Educational and Training Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Elected Times 
First Term Second Term Third Term 
1.54608764 1.811091232 1.490081913 
 
Second-term mayors more tried to invest human capital. They realized the importance of 
human resources after their first term. On the other side, third-term mayors relatively didn’t 
try to invest in man power, because they had no other choice to be elected by the law.  
 
Table 171: Statistical Significance Test about the Educational and Training 
Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s Elected Times 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
ANOVA
EDUFEE
2.270 3 .757 .384 .765
445.678 226 1.972
447.948 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ANOVA
EDUFEE
4.014 2 2.007 1.026 .360
443.934 227 1.956
447.948 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Table 172: The Educational and Training Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s 
Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
Non-Assemblymen Ex-Assemblymen 
1.550815588 1.848580738 
 
The mayors, who served as assemblymen in national assembly or local council, spent more 
29.77% point budget. Ex-assemblymen had experience for managing municipality as 
observers. Their previous experiences are helpful for role of mayor in local municipality. 
Therefore mayors, who were assemblymen, learned the importance of human resources by 
parliamentary activity.  
 
Table 173: Statistical Significance Test about the Educational and Training 
Expenditures through Analysis on Mayor’s Political Experience as an Assemblyman  
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
Table 174: The Educational and Training Expenditures through Analysis on The change 
of mayor before the termination of his or her office 
Non-Change Change 
1.64732042 1.552607867 
 
ANOVA
EDUFEE
4.134 1 4.134 2.124 .146
443.813 228 1.947
447.948 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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The change of mayor is a little meaningful on the educational and training expenditures. The 
local govern, which are not changed their power system, spent more 9.47% point budget for 
employee’s education and training.  
 
Table 175: Statistical Significance Test about the Educational and Training 
Expenditures through Analysis on The change of mayor before the termination of his or 
her office 
 
However, the result is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
  
ANOVA
EDUFEE
.234 1 .234 .119 .730
447.714 228 1.964
447.948 229
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, lots of results were statistically non-significant. 19 of total 84 results were just 
statistically significant. It was 22.6% of all result. 
 
Four results in the part of mayor’s career experience were statically significant. The rate of 
event and festival expenditures showed that mayors who were businessmen spent more 
budgets for event and festival than other mayors. Other mayors made an increase of 4 % over 
that of last year. However, businessmen made an increase of 10% over that of last year.  
The rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning showed that politicians were 
ranked in the top of the rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning. 
Businessmen took the second ranked position. Officials and professionals touched the bottom 
line.  
 
The Educational and Training Expenditures showed that businessmen are ranked on the first 
stage. They almost doubled the educational and training expenditures than professionals. The 
numerical values mean mayor’s intention for human management. In generally, CEOs are 
more attentions to human resources, because they need to make outputs in short time. In firm, 
human power means their good productivity.  
However, the degree change rates of the local government’s financial independence were 
almost the same. Professional experience didn’t effect on the degree of local government’s 
financial independence.  
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Five results in the part of mayor’s political spectrum were statically significant. The rate of 
event and festival expenditures showed that Grand National Party spent more money than 
Democratic Party for local event and festival.  
 
GNP was a ruling party and became to observe budget execution policies. GNP’s score was 
higher than other parties. Grand National Party was ranked in the top of the rate of budget 
execution on mid-term financial planning. The gap between GNP and Democratic Party was 
more 3% point.  
 
However, Democratic Party observed more than Grand National Party on the budge rate of 
reviewed public works for loan & investment. The rate was more 13.7% points. The local tax 
collection rates are almost the same. The party of mayor didn’t effect on the local tax 
collection rate.  
 
Six results in the part of mayor’s educational background were statically significant. Mayors’ 
educational background didn’t effect on the degree of local government’s financial 
independence. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Mayors’ 
educational background didn’t effect on the fiscal self-reliance ratio. There are no differences 
among each mayor’s group score. . The educational background of mayor didn’t effect on the 
local tax collection rate. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. Mayor’s 
educational background is also an important factor for expenditures to private sector. But 
there are few influences in educational background. 
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However, mayors who graduated under high school extraordinarily take high score in 
educational background part. They take more 25.4% points than any other mayors in 
increasing rate of internal financing. The more mayors took high degree, the more they 
observed the ratio of budget execution.  
 
Only one result in the part of mayor’s political experience as an assemblyman was statically 
significant. Mayors who were a lawmaker in local or national assembly observed more the 
mid-term financial plan. Their official experience affected on mayor’s financial decisions.  
 
Three results in the part of the change of mayor before the termination his or her office were 
statically significant. The results are almost the same. The change of mayor didn’t effect on 
the local tax collection rate. There are no differences among each mayor’s group score. The 
change of mayor affected on the rate of budget execution on mid-term financial planning. 
Mayors who didn’t their position in the termination of office took more 2.6% point. It is 
proved that the change of mayors affected on the financial stability. The change of 
governance means the alteration of public plan and management team and long-term plan of 
the city could be spoiled. The change of leadership in the termination of office affected on the 
budge rate of reviewed public works for loan & investment. It was opposition result. The 
local government which changed mayor unexpectedly observed more on the budge rate of 
reviewed public works for loan & investment.  
 
The all the result was statistically non-significant in the part of mayor’s Age Group and 
mayor’s Elected Times.  
 
102 
 
At first, I would like to search whether mayor’s characteristics affect on the financial 
performance in local government. And I divide their characters into their profession, party, 
age, educational background, elected times, experience as a lawmaker and the change of 
mayor. Some results were statically significant. However, a large proportion of the result was 
statically non-significant. Some results showed that there were no differences among each 
mayor’s group score. There, I conclude that mayor’s experiences did not influence on their 
performances and their abilities did not reflect local governments’ performance.  
 
But I will research that the relation between leader’s characters and his or her performance. In 
this paper, the population was small and it caused that a large proportion of the result was 
statically non-significant. I will expand the size of population in the next research on 
leadership and performance. 
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